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Abstract
Correlations of the type discussed by EPR in their original 1935 paradox
for continuous variables exist for the quadrature phase amplitudes of two
spatially separated fields. These correlations were experimentally reported
in 1992. We propose to use such EPR beams in quantum cryptography, to
transmit predetermined messages in such a way that the receiver and sender
may later determine whether eavesdropping has occurred.
Intriguing is the possibility of using quantum mechanics to transmit signals in a way that
any eavesdropping can be detected by the receiver and sender. This new eld of quantum
cryptography [1,2] has attracted much attention.
In the pioneering proposal of Bennett and Brassard [1] the sender (Alice) transmits to
the receiver (Bob) photon pulses in one of two orthogonal polarisations (labeled 0 and 1),
where the orientation (basis) of polarisation randomly shifts between 0o and 45o. The 0; 1
choice of polarisation represents the bit value. Bob randomly selects a basis (0o or 45o) for a
polarisation measurement, and records the resulting bit value. Alice and Bob later compare
notes, through a public channel, on the sequence of orientations (0o or 45o) chosen. The bit
sequence where Bob selected the same orientation as Alice forms a key, to be used later to
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encrypt messages. While classically an eavesdropper could measure with perfect accuracy
components of polarisation along both directions, quantum mechanics forbids this by way of
the uncertainty principle. As a consequence the eavesdropper cannot always regenerate the
original state transmitted by Alice. The resulting discrepancy between the results recorded
by Alice and Bob gives warning to the interference by the eavesdropper. No discrepancy
implies a secure key.
Other proposals [2] suggest to use a sequence of two spatially separated photons with
correlated polarisation, and whose joint polarisation measurements are predicted by quan-
tum mechanics to show a violation of a Bell inequality [3]. Such elds have no local hidden
variable interpretation. Any measurement, and subsequent state regeneration to mask in-
terference, by an eavesdropper along one of these two channels will alter the statistics so
that a Bell inequality is always satised. Again a fundamental aspect of quantum mechanics
is utilized to alert receiver and sender to eavesdropping.
The proposals so far focus on the use of single photons to transmit information. A signif-
icant limitation to the practicality of such schemes is the poor eciency of photon counting
detectors. This contributes to a signicant loss factor which makes direct ecient commu-
nication of sequences predetermined by Alice dicult [4]. Photon-based proposals rely in
practice on deciphering a sequence (key) a posteriori from infrequent detected photons.
Our approach [5] is to point out the potential of using a dierent cryptographic scheme
based on measurement of (continuous variable) eld quadrature phase amplitudes. Corre-
lations of the type discussed by Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen (EPR) in their original 1935
paradox [6], for continuous variables, exist for the quadrature phase amplitudes of two spa-
tially separated elds [7]. The technology of quadrature phase amplitude measurement is
suciently advanced that in 1992 these correlations were detected, without detection e-
ciency problems, by Ou et al [8]. Such EPR correlated beams have recently been utilized
to enable quantum state teleportation with continuous variables [9]. Further recent work
[10] has shown that quadrature phase amplitude measurements on certain twin beams can
predict a violation of Bell inequalities.
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In this paper we show how such EPR correlated beams may be used to transmit a
predetermined message (or key) directly from sender to receiver, where later communication
through a public channel between sender and receiver can check whether eavesdropping has
occurred. The scheme involves only quadrature phase amplitude measurements, which can
be performed with high eciency. The predetermined nature of the sequence could aid
incorporation of special repeaters, where the signal and correlated beams are regenerated to
help compensate for transmission loss.
Consider the nondegenerate parametric down conversion process, modeled in simplistic
fashion by two eld modes with boson operators a^ and b^, with the interaction Hamiltonian
HI = ih(a^
yb^y − a^b^). We dene the quadrature phase amplitudes X^a = (a^ + a^y) and P^a =
(a^− a^y)=i, with similar denitions for the mode b^. The Heisenberg uncertainty relation for
the orthogonal amplitudes of mode a^ is 2Xa
2Pa  1. The output quadrature amplitudes
are
X^a(t) = X^a(0)cosh(t) + X^b(0)sinh(t)
X^b(t) = X^b(0)cosh(t) + X^a(0)sinh(t)
P^a(t) = P^a(0)cosh(t)− P^b(0)sinh(t)
P^b(t) = P^b(0)cosh(t)− P^a(0)sinh(t): (1)
where  is proportional to the strength of the parametric interaction and the t = 0 operators
represent inputs. As t increases, X^a(t) becomes increasingly correlated with X^b(t), and
P^a(t) becomes increasingly correlated with −P^b(t), the correlation becoming perfect in the
limit T ! 1. With output elds a^ and b^ spatially separated, this is the situation [7] of
the 1935 EPR correlations.
For nonideal correlation, the degree of correlation may still be sucient to ensure EPR
correlations [7]. The results for measurements X^a(t) and X^b(t) (or P^a(t) and P^b(t)) can be
compared, yielding an estimate of the error in inferring the result of measurement X^a(t)
on mode a^, based on a measurement X^b(t) on mode b^. We calculate x = X^a(t) − γX^b(t)
and p = P^a(t) + γP^b(t), where the factor γ may be modied to give the minimum error.
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x > − < x >2 and 2p,inf =< 2p > − < p >2. The minimum variance
2x,inf,min (and 
2
p,inf,min) occurs for a particular value of γ. Finding the turning point with





b (T )− [< X^a(T ); X^b(T ) >]2
X^2b (T )
(2)
where < x; y >=< xy > − < x >< y > and one deduces a 2p,inf,min in similar fashion.
EPR correlations are obtained when the product 2x,inf
2
p,inf drops below the quantum
limit given by 2Xa
2Pa  1 [7]:
2x,inf
2
p,inf < 1: (3)
For arbitrary coherent input states, we predict from the solution (1) that [7] (γ = tanh 2t)
2x,inf,min = 
2
p,inf,min = 1= cosh 2t (4)
An identical argument and results hold if the measured operators are Xa− < Xa >, Xb− <
Xb >, Pa− < Pa > and Pb− < Pb >, the fluctuations about the mean, as opposed to Xa,
Xb, Pa and Pb.
For the purposes of cryptography [11], Alice chooses as input to the nondegenerate para-
metric amplier [12] one of two possible states: the input for a^ is either a coherent state
j0 >a (bit value 1) or a coherent state ji0 >a (bit value 0), where 0 is real. The input
for b^ is a vacuum state j0 >b. The signal is transmitted by spatially separating the two
output elds and propagating to Bob the output eld of mode a^. Bob can read the message
by measuring either X^a(t) or P^a(t). Suppose Bob chooses to measure X^a(t). The proba-
bility distribution for his obtaining a result x, given Alice’s choice ji0 >, is the gaussian
exp [−x2=22]=p2 with mean zero and standard deviation  =
√
cosh2 t + sinh2 t. If
Alice chose j0 > the probability for Bob’s outcome is exp [−(x− 20 cosh t)2=22]=
p
2,
the gaussian mean shifted to 20 cosh t. Provided   20 cosh t, the bit value is clearly
determined from Bob’s result x: x near 20 cosh t implies 1; x near zero implies 0. The
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bit value can also be determined by a measurement of quadrature phase amplitude P^a(t),
in this case the input j0 > giving the gaussian distribution about zero (bit value 1), while
ji0 > gives the distribution centered about 20 cosh t (bit value 0).
Bob records the results of his consecutive quadrature phase measurements, randomly se-
lecting to measure either X^a(t) or P^a(t), and subtracting from his result either 20 cosh t or
zero, so that only the fluctuation about the mean of the particular distribution is recorded.
Bob then communicates to Alice, through a public channel, the sequence of recorded fluc-
tuations together with measurements (X^a(t) or P^a(t)) chosen (the bit value itself is not
communicated). Alice also makes a sequence of consecutive measurements X^b(t) or P^b(t),
(preferably) to coincide with Bob’s measurement sequence, and records similarly only the
fluctuation about the mean (in this case 20 sinh t or zero for Xb, and −20 sinh t or
zero for Pb). Bob and Alice compare notes, through the public channel, to calculate a
2x,inf
2
p,inf . The predicted minimum is, for optimized γ, given by (4).
Verication by Bob and Alice of the EPR correlations 2x,inf
2
p,inf < 1 gives a sensitive
measure of interference by an eavesdropper (Eve). To determine the signal Eve may measure
either X^a or P^a. However quantum mechanics forbids the measurement of both amplitudes
to an uncertainty better than that given by the Heisenberg uncertainty relation. Eve cannot
regenerate and transmit to Bob a single mode state with both well dened X^ and P^ , but
is limited by 2X^2P^  1. For example Eve may select to measure X^a to a precision of
X^a = 1=r and then regenerate a state with this reduced fluctuation in X, so that the new
operator describing the quadrature measurement now made by Bob is X^newa = X^a + X^a
where 2X^a = 1=r. Quantum mechanics compels an enhanced fluctuation in P^ , so that the
operator describing the quadrature measurement P^a by Bob is P^
new
a = P^a+P^a where at best
2P^ = r for a minimum uncertainty state. The variances 2x,inf,min and 
2
p,inf,min testing







2P^ , where here we have 2x,inf,min = 
2
p,inf,min = 1= cosh t. This gives
2x,inf,min
2




p,inf  1, the loss of EPR correlations making a sensitive test for interference on the
channel represented by mode a^ [13].
The presence of loss due to transmission need not eect the determination of the signal,
since 0 can be made suciently large. However the degree of EPR correlation is aected by
loss. Loss, and also detection ineciencies, may be modeled by a beam splitter which mixes





1− a^vac: Here  is the overall eciency factor. The new noise levels measured by
Bob are 2xnew ,inf,min = 
22x,inf,min + (1 − 2) and 2pnew ,inf,min = 22p,inf,min + (1 − 2).
With  less than one, a partial loss, EPR correlations are still maintained, though decreased.
Only in the limit of complete loss do we obtain 2xnew ,inf,min = 
2
pnew,inf,min = 1.
In practice, the degree of EPR correlation for a given transmission distance would be
accurately established. The solutions show us that this degree of correlation is independent
of Alice’s choice of input coherent state. Any increase of our EPR noise indicator above
this pre-evaluated level alerts Bob to the additional loss or interference caused by a partial
tapping of the channel by Eve. A continual tapping by Eve will bring levels back to 1.
The terminology \EPR correlations" in this paper does not imply correlations which
violate a Bell inequality. However schemes using the nonlocal aspect of quantum mechanics
[2] can also be proposed for quadrature phase detection, since the failure of local realism has
recently [10] been predicted possible for such measurements, for certain types of quantum




jr0eiς >a jr0e−iς >b d& (5)
Here N is a normalisation coecient, we choose r0 = 1:1 and j >q (q = a; b) is a coherent
state for the mode q^. Also we might consider the two-mode \Schrodinger cat" state under-
going interaction for a time t with a parametric amplier to give the \squeezed cat state"
[10]
jΨ >= NU^ (j0 >a j0 >b +j − 0 >a j − 0 >b) (6)
where U = exp [−iH^It=h], and we choose 0 = 0 = 0:9 and t = 0:6
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After generation of the state (5) (or (6)), the two elds a^ and b^ are spatially separated.
Alice may then choose to phase shift the eld a^ by 180o or not, this choice of relative phase
between a^ and b^ being her signal [14]. The eld a^ is then propagated to Bob at a distant
location A.
The nonlocal aspect of these elds could be used to detect eavesdropping. The signal is
transmitted from Alice to Bob in the form of blocks, consisting of many (N say where N
is large) identical states with the same value of phase shift. Bob measures at a location A
a quadrature phase amplitude X^Aθ = X^a cos  + P^a sin  for each state comprising a certain
block, where  randomly varies between  = 0; =2; 3=2, for state (5) (or between  =
0; 0:42;−0:28; 1:42; 0:72 for state (6)). Alice also makes a series of measurements X^Bφ =
X^b cos  + P^b sin  at a location B, where  randomly varies between  = 0;−=4;−3=4,
for state (5) (or between  = 0;−0:28; 0:42 for state (6)). Alice then communicates to
Bob through a public channel the results for her quadrature phase amplitude measurements.
Bob may build up, for each block, the probability distribution P (qa; qb) for getting results
qa and qb upon measurement of X^a at a^ and X^b at b^ respectively. This information is given
by the  = 0 and  = 0 measurements. The shape of the distribution changes with the
choice of phase shift, and gives the bit value. This information is not determinable from
the measurements of amplitudes made on b^ alone, and hence cannot be determined by the
information passed along the public channel.
To check whether eavesdropping has occurred, Bob constructs a test of a Bell inequality
as follows. The result of the measurement is classied as +1 if the quadrature phase result x
is greater than or equal to zero, and −1 otherwise. We dene the probability distributions:




+ () for obtaining +1 at b^ upon
measurement of X^Bφ ; and P
AB
++ (; ) the joint probability of obtaining a +1 result at both
a^ and b^. The existence of a local hidden variable theory implies the \strong" Bell-Clauser-
Horne inequality [3].
S =
P AB++ (; )− P AB++ (; 0) + P AB++ (0; ) + P AB++ (0; 0)
P A+ (0) + P B+ ()
 1 (7)
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For state (5), a violation of this inequality occurs with S  1:0157, and with angles given by
 = 0;  = −=4; 0 = =2; 0 = −3=4 [10]. For state (6), violation given by S = 1:008 is
obtained for angles  = 0:42;  = −0:28; 0 = 0:28; 0 = 0:42 [10]. The above violations
also hold for the states generated by phase shifting a^ by 180o, with the choice of angles for
 as before, but replacing  with  +  and 0 with 0 + .
Violation of the Bell inequality at the level predicted by quantum mechanics ensures that
no interference by an eavesdropper (Eve) has occurred along a^ (see Ekert [2] for spin-1=2
systems). Suppose Eve performs a measurement on the eld a^, measuring X^Aθ0 say to obtain a
result xθ0 . She then generates and transmits to Bob a state jxθ0 ,θ0 >. The density operator
for the new combined system is  = Bxθ0 ,θ0
Axθ0 ,θ0
where Bxθ0 ,θ0
=< xθ0 jΨ >< Ψjxθ0 > is the
reduced density matrix for eld b^ given the measurement by Eve, jxθ0 > is the eigenstate of
X^Aθ0 , and 
A
xθ0 ,θ0
= jxθ0 ,θ0 >< xθ0 ,θ0j. Bob tests for the Bell inequality using P ABx,y (; ), the
joint probability for respective results x and y for measurements X^Aθ and X^
B
φ . If intervention
has occurred,





P (xθ0; 0) < yφj < xθ0 jΨ >< Ψjxθ0 > jyφ >< xθjxθ0 ,θ0 >< xθ0 ,θ0jxθ > (8)
where P (xθ0 ; 0) is the probability that Eve obtains a result xθ0 for her measurement. We
have the form P ABx,y (; ) =
∫
() pAx (; )p
B
y (; ) d from which a Bell inequality fol-
lows, regardless of the choice of state regenerated by Eve.
In terms of current feasibility, the second scheme based on the Bell inequality is more
likely to be limited by diculty of state preparation and susceptibility to loss ( = 0:96
destroys violations [10]).
The rst scheme, not so limited by these issues, may oer advantages over schemes uti-
lizing photon counting. The high detection eciencies give a very much reduced overall
loss factor, which may make it possible to transmit directly and eciently a predetermined
message, while later checking provides a means to check security. The generation and detec-
tion of EPR correlations with 2x,inf
2
p,inf = 0:7 has been achieved
[8]. The generation of
squeezed (where 2X^Aθ < 1 for some ) optical and soliton pulses
[15] opens up possibilities
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for transmission of EPR correlated elds. The robustness of squeezing to propagation loss
has not been keenly explored experimentally, but similar distances should be achievable for
EPR correlations. This loss represents the chief limitation to secure long distance transmis-
sion, since loss acts to degrade the EPR correlations which must be kept at 2x,inf
2
p,inf < 1.
Repeated detection and regeneration of new EPR elds with signal encoded could help com-
bat loss. Security then relies on a set of senders and receivers being able to communicate
reliably at a later stage, after the detections [16].
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